Showing posts with label Canada. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canada. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Gotta Catch ‘Em All: Nintendo Pulls The Plug On 3D Printed Pokémon Planters



Claudia Ng is obviously a big fan of Pokémon. So much so that she decided to design 3D printed planters in the shape of her “personal favourite starter Pokémon”, Bulbasaur. She posted and offered these ceramic planters for sale on Shapeways, an online marketplace for 3D printed items. According to a GameZone post, the original Shapeways page featuring the planters was pulled when the website got a takedown request from Nintendo saying that the planters infringed its copyright. Much like YouTube and Facebook, Shapeways has a copyright content policy and takedown procedure (outlined here) which allows copyright holders to address these issues quickly and effectively.
 
The adorable side of copyright infringement
According to Ms. Ng, Nintendo asked that the page be taken down and for all monies generated from products already shipped by Shapeways. It is unclear whether Nintendo will pursue any formal copyright infringement proceedings against Ms. Ng or the Shapeways website. Its recourse against the latter may be significantly curtailed depending on the forum of a potential suit. This is because many countries, including the U.S. and Canada, have enacted provisions in their respective copyright laws limiting the liability of internet intermediaries or ISPs.

3D printing technology promises to hold many challenges to IP rights holders. These challenges will extend beyond the copyright space to touch patents and trademarks as well. On the bright side, rights holders should be encouraged by Shapeways’ response to this claim and hope that other players in the 3D printing market follow suit. 

From the perspective of someone looking to create and sell content on these sites, takedown policies will always be a looming nuisance. There will invariably be frivolous claims and false claims of infringement made out of malice. It may sometimes prove difficult (and costly) to discern legitimate from illegitimate copyright claims. One need only look at YouTube’s copyright policy to get a notion of the major machinery involved in implementing a fair copyright takedown system.

 Google has developed a highly advanced ContentID system whereby rights holders may submit reference files to YouTube of their copyright protected audio and audiovisual works. YouTube compares all videos uploaded to its service to the content stored in this reference database to weed out infringing uploads. YouTube has created a manual copyright claim process for those uploads that are missed by this system. Instead of each claim resulting in an automatic takedown, the policy allows for a time period during which the uploader may make a “counter-claim”. The original claimant may also withdraw an erroneous claim during this period. 

Google has the funds and manpower to do this; smaller websites may not. Since national laws, such as the ISP safe harbour provisions in the American DMCA, often require that qualifying ISPs have a robust takedown procedure, websites like Shapeways are more likely to favour caution and adopt a policy of “when in doubt, take it down”. The hope is that this reality does not have a chilling effect on the productivity enabled by the exciting new technology that is 3D printing and the innovative services growing around it.

Monday, August 15, 2011

CIRA Changes Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy For .CA


For well over a decade now, Canadians have become accustomed to seeing “.ca” all over the web.  The Canadian web suffix is one of the fastest growing top level domains (TLDs) in the world.  For many domain registrants, .ca serves as a branding tool to designate a site or product as being “made in Canada”.  While the web may not have national boarders (at least not the type patrolled by customs agents), the argument can be made that a .ca designation serves as a key identifier and one Canadians (and those seeking Canadian content) use often to distinguish sites registered in Canada from the rest of the internet’s vast repertoire.

Photo by Svilen Milev
.ca is a “country code top-level domain” (ccTLD) and like any TLD must be overseen by a governing body. The Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) is the organization responsible for managing the .ca domain.  Established in 1998, CIRA took over the management of the .ca domain in 2000.  Until that time, it was overseen by a volunteer organization based out of UBC (lead by John Demco, former Computing Facilities Manager at the UBC Department of Computer Science).  According to CIRA, since it’s founding, over 1.6 million .ca domain names have been registered. 

Among the many tasks CIRA carries out, probably the most important is the implementation of its Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (CDRP).  This policy (an off-shoot of ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)) is CIRA’s adjudication process by which trademark owners and businesses may enforce their marks against registrants who they believe are in violation of their rights. Businesses can also use this forum to combat cyber squatting- the practice of buying up domain names only to sell them to businesses who wish to register them at a higher price. 

The changes to the CDRP include:

“Rights” and “Use”: CIRA has seen fit to do away with these definitions in the policy.  On their web site CIRA explains that these definitions are more than anything a hindrance and create “overly technical and complex requirements in terms of what rights qualify for protection”.

Codification of “confusingly similar” analysis: CIRA has opted to standardize the test utilized by its panellists when determining whether a domain name is confusingly similar with a complainants mark. They’ve opted to use the “narrow resemblance” test over the traditional , broader confusion analysis of trademark law.  This test focuses on how much the domain name in question resembles the complainants mark in “appearance, sound and suggested idea” (see CIRA web site for more detail on the test).  

Changes to Bad Faith: If a complainant wishes their action to succeed, they must show, as per paragraph 4.1 of the CDRP, that the domain name was registered in bad faith (the act defines bad faith in paragraph 3.5).  The bad faith factors listed in the policy are now non-exhaustive- meaning that complainants may attempt to show bad faith on the part of the registrant in a manner not specifically contemplated by the policy.  CIRA has also added "use for commercial gain" to the list of factors mentioned in the CDRP.

Electronic filing: CIRA is now allowing parties to file all documents electronically in addition to hard copy filing.  If one wishes to file documents in hard copy, five copies must be made and faxed where one electronic copy is sufficient.  Wouldn’t it be nice if courts would follow suit...we can dream.

A more exhaustive list of modifications made to the CDRP can be found at the above link to CIRA’s web site.

Speculation on the changes has already crept into the blogosphere.  Professor Michael Geist, while praising some of the changes as being efficacious and appropriate to the Canadian context, had at least one criticism against the modification of the bad faith factors to become non-exhaustive:

“The exhaustive list was intended to guard against the ICANN experience where dispute panellists ventured well beyond clear cases of cybersquatting by creating their own categories of bad faith. Under the new CIRA policy, the bad faith list is now non-exhaustive, opening the door to more domain name dispute claims and increasing the risk of inconsistent decisions.”

Only time will tell if CIRA’s new moves will have the effect of streamlining the domain dispute resolution process.  The standardization of the confusion test should militate in favour of that reality while the opening of the bad faith factors may (according to Geist) hinder it. Whatever, the outcome, no one can rightly accuse CIRA of inaction.  

Sunday, July 24, 2011

Copyright in Databases?


Can one have copyright in a database? For those familiar with the law, it is clear that raw data itself is not protected by copyright. If it were, the phonebook (or whoever else was “first to fix” my information) would have a copyright on my name, address and telephone number.  

Photo by Renjith Krishnan
Databases are considered “compilations” under copyright law.  Both the Canadian and American Copyright Acts grant copyright protection to the compiler. Section 2 of the Canadian act defines a compilation as: “a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works or of parts thereof, or a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of data” (Emphasis added).  This means that the data collected in the database need not be original or creative.  A list of names and numbers may be eligible for protection as a compilation.  The copyrightable element of the work is the “selection and arrangement” on the part of the compiler. 

For example, last year, Professor Michael Geist put together a collection of scholarly, peer-reviewed articles on Canadian copyright and the (then) new bill C-32 (electronic version available free at the above link).  Each chapter comprised a paper written by a different academic.  Some of the articles contain a very short forward by Geist.  In this case, professor Geist has copyright in the compilation.  Though he didn’t write the majority of the collection, he was the organizer (or to use the terms of the law the “selector and arranger”) of the content.

How much creativity or effort a person must put into this selection process is not readily discernable.   In the 1991 American Supreme Court decision known commonly as Feist, the principles of which have been adopted in Canada, the court solidified the applicable test in an effort to demystify this standard.

The court’s decision in Feist comes down to a two part test:
  • Is the material (selection and arrangement) copyrightable in favour of the compiler?
  • Has the defendant reproduced an infringing amount of the copyrightable material?

The answer to the first question varies from one jurisdiction to another.  There are essentially two competing doctrines to determine the copyright-ability of a work: the “creativity” approach and the “sweat of the brow” approach.  

In jurisdictions like Australia and the UK, a compiler will be granted copyright in their database if they dedicated a substantial amount of time, money and/or resources to its completion. This has largely been the Commonwealth tradition of which Canada is historically a part. 

The creativity approach demands that the person claiming copyright in their database demonstrate that they exercised a minimal amount of creative energy in selecting and arranging the data.  This is the approach held up in Feist which had to do with a telephone directory.

In that case, the appellant Feist was a company whose business it was to compile large telephone directories from smaller local directories.  The plaintiff, Rural, sued Feist for copyright infringement and lost due to there having been no originality whatsoever exercised by them in the selection and arrangement of their data.  The court tells us that originality (by way of creativity) has always been the cornerstone of copyright in the US. That being said, the threshold for creativity is very low.  One must simply demonstrate a spark of originality.  For example, alphabetically listing the names and phone numbers of everyone living in a geographical area is totally unoriginal. However, perhaps a register of restaurants in a designated geographical area listed by style or genre would be eligible.  To pass the creativity test, it is unnecessary that the compiler show true novelty or non-obviousness as in patent law.  They must simply show that “spark” the court speaks of so romantically.

As mentioned above, Canada has historically followed its commonwealth roots and the “sweat of the brow” approach. However, the precedent setting Canadian case in this area shows great consistency with the American approach.

In Tele-Direct v. ABI, the Federal Court of Appeals upheld the Trial Court’s decision that the elements of Tele-Direct’s Yellow Pages directory were not in themselves sufficiently original.  While ABI admitted from the outset that Tele-Direct had copyright in the overall compilation, the court found that insufficient originality was exercised in the selection and arrangement of the “sub-categories” (the information in each individual listing).  ABI didn’t copy the overall form of Tele-Direct’s Yellow Pages; they simply copied the data in the individual listings, which were themselves, not organized or arranged in a sufficiently original manner to be worthy of copyright protection.

This break with the Commonwealth trend is probably due in part to Canada’s adherence to NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and TRIPs (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights). In his 1998 submission to Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage, Professor Robert Howell highlights article 1705(1)(b) of NAFTA which reads as follows:

“1. Each Party shall protect the works covered by Article 2 of the Berne
Convention, including any other works that embody original expression within the
meaning of that Convention. In particular:
. . .
“(b) compilation of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other
form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute
intellectual creations, shall be protected as such” (emphasis added).

He further purports that the intention in defining compilation this way was likely to coincide with the definition given in the 1976 US Copyright Act: “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembly of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term ‘compilation’ includes collective works.” (emphasis added).

In the EU, databases benefit from the protection of two legislative regimes.  As in North America, database creators in Europe may avail themselves to regular copyright protection. They may also make use of the “European Database Directive” (DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC). This Sui Generis regime doesn’t require the database creator to have invested any level of creativity or originality in his work.

Article 7 section 1 of the directive reads as follows:

“Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.” (emphasis added).
This regime clearly endorses the “sweat of the brow” approach. Though some may disagree with this standard, the Directive comprises another provision that is by far more controversial and altogether unsettling.

Though Article 7 section 1 of the directive says that the term of protection afforded the database under the law is 15 years, section 3 of the same article reads as follows:

“Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents of a database, including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which would result in the database being considered to be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify the database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection.”

This essentially means that by making simple alterations, additions or subtractions of content or structure, the term resets for another 15 years.  This amounts to what is clearly “evergreen” protection for databases in the EU.

While this directive has been going strong in Europe for the past 15 years, neither the US or Canada have enacted similar legislation, most likely because they aren’t convinced it’s necessary to do so.

As the EU continues to distinguish itself in the area of database protection, the west seems to be coming together.  Though originality with reference to copyrightable works is constitutionally mandated in the US (Article 1, section 1, clause 8), no such Constitutional obligation exists in Canada.  That being said, both international agreements and the interest of uniformity have seen Canada and the US align closely on the judicial treatment of copyright in databases.  It is my belief that with the monumental growth of cloud computing and online data storage, congruity in this area may prove beneficial to the attraction of American companies who wish to be certain that they may obtain Canadian copyright in their property.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Copyright in the Cloud

“The Cloud”.  For those who keep up with tech this term is nothing new.  For those who do not, “The Cloud” or “Cloud Computing” refers to web based software and online data storage.  The growing trend in computing today seems to denote a shift away from hard disk storage and software to this new online framework.  
Three of the major players- among others- in the tech space are harnessing the power of the cloud to offer web based music player and storage services.  On May 10th, Google unveiled its new online music storage service at the Google I/O conference.   Amazon has already released their “Cloud Player” and Apple is reportedly in the process of coming out with their cloud based music offering.

Though these services are not and likely will not make it to Canada in the short term, the question beckons as to whether or not they would present copyright issues here.  Leaving out the obvious distribution licensing issues, the current Canadian Copyright Act does not allow for format shifting (the transferring of a media from one format to another). 

The format most widely used to encode digital music is without a doubt the MP3.  So if the music is uploaded in MP3 format there is no issue.  However, not all music files are MP3’s.  WMA, AIFF and FLAC are just some of the other file formats in which people’s music are often encoded.  In this event, the service provider- in this case Google Amazon or Apple- would be forced to convert the file type into MP3 format to render it compatible with the player. 

This would ultimately mean that the service providers must acquire a publishing license to properly operate the service.  Such a consideration might appear to be minor; but in reality it may prove to be a larger barrier to entry than one would think.  Needless to say a publishing license would be more costly.  Also, the music purchased from the provider would always be in MP3 form meaning that any format shifting that need occur would only concern music files the person uploaded from their existing library.  Therefore, the additional cost of licensing would be a bullet the service providers would have to take without seeing a profit directly related to it.  These providers will likely swallow this cost as a necessary evil.  After all, web based music services become much less attractive if the consumer cannot upload the music they have previously acquired.

The now defunct Bill C-32, Canada`s most recent attempt at modernizing our contextually archaic copyright law, provided for a “consumer exception” that would allow format shifting for private use.   It is unclear however if that would include this type of activity.  The provision was originally conceived to allow consumers to transfer their media from one platform to another (i.e. from a CD to an IPod).  In this case, it would be Google or Amazon executing the format shift.  Furthermore, one of the requirements in the Bill is that the original copy not be infringing.  Therefore, if the service provider is caught format shifting their client’s illegally downloaded music, the provision would not apply and they could feasibly be held liable for secondary infringement. 

It is clear that tech is going the way of the cloud.  It will become increasingly difficult for Canadian policy to ignore that fact.  It is somewhat embarrassing that Canadian copyright law has not been modified since 1997.  That’s two years prior to the birth of Napster!  One thing is certain. Further neglect to the modernization of copyright in Canada will have the undesired effect of leaving us in the dust of technological progress; an outcome most Canadians are probably unwilling to accept.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

Copyright Law and Appropriation Art: Part 1

Visit soon for part 2 of this piece 
Art forms change.  Entire systems, styles and genres have come and gone, spotting the annals of history with new and old methods of creating art.  Traditionally, law has had a certain trouble keeping up with the avant-garde.  This is attributable to the phenomena of legal delay and legal uncertainty in dealing with new art forms and types of creations.  An excellent example of this is the manner in which American (and to a lesser extent Canadian) copyright law treat Appropriation Art.

Appropriation Art, in its broadest sense can be defined as “the use of borrowed elements in the creation of a new work”.[i]  Modern examples of Appropriation Art can be found in various artistic domains.  Some say that the 1970’s Appropriation Art movement (most famously headed by artists like Andy Warhol) marked the beginning of this style.  However, Professor Jessica Silbey of Suffolk University Law School suggests that some art experts point as far back as Leonardo Da Vinci for examples of Appropriation Art (Da Vinci used scientific drawings of human anatomy in his artistic expression).[ii]

One of the most common places to find Appropriation Art today is the internet (more specifically YouTube).  The advent of video and musical mash-ups and remixes has taken us well beyond Warhol’s “Campbell’s Tomato Soup”.  For example, musical artist GirlTalk uses snippets of dozens of existing music tracks to create a new expressive work that is all his own. Lovers of Japanese Anime often engage in an art form known as AMV (Anime Music Video) where they meticulously splice clips from their favorite shows together with music to create a form of homage or tribute.

Jefferson’s view
To some people, the appropriation of other artists’ works in simple theft.  After all, if a person takes my property and uses it himself without permission, it is rather intuitive to conclude that he is guilty of an offense.  Unfortunately this view does not consider the original context in which intellectual property rights were created. Thomas Jefferson famously wrote: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.”[iii]

            This passage tells us that, far from natural, intellectual property rights are a creation of the government.  They are a legal fiction fashioned for the purpose of stimulating innovation and growth in a culture where people often require incentives and guarantees in order to create. This may sound bizarre to some; in reality, most people will opt not to create if they know that, once divulged, their creations can be mimicked and copied with no possible recourse.  It is for that very reason that Jefferson saw the value in intellectual property rights.  However, he goes on to say that:

He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction him-self without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light with-out darkening me.”[iv]
  
Jefferson obviously recognizes that “intellectual property” and “real property” are different in certain key respects. Applying this concept to Appropriation Art, using your source material in the creation of my new work does not necessarily disadvantage you or your original material.  In fact, sometimes such an appropriation by a well known or famous person may have substantially positive effects on the original work or creator. On the contrary, if I take the siding off of your house to construct a new house for myself, I am clearly stealing and in so doing disadvantaging you by appropriating something you own away from you and to myself.   

  Jefferson viewed monopoly in general as evil.  He saw the way British monopolies had the effect of centralizing wealth in the hands of a powerful few to the detriment of the people and the culture as a whole. Conflictingly, Jefferson recognized that artists must be protected if they are to be motivated to create new art.  Copyright, therefore, is a “necessary evil” instrumental in the proportion of what is good- Creation and innovation.


The Copy “right” and “derivative works”

Copyright law in Canada[v] and the U.S[vi] includes the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, license and perform a work.  It also confers the right to create or license “derivative works”.  The U.S Copyright law defines derivative work as:

[A] work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”.”[vii]

No definition for the term derivative work is given in the Canadian copyright act.  Nevertheless, the American definition seems to fit quite nicely into the Canadian context as well. One Canadian case[viii] even interpreted translation to include the translation of a computer program from one coding language to another.

The rights an author has in derivatives works was originally conceived so that no other person could adapt an artist’s work into another medium, format or language and call it their own.  This, by all accounts, seems rather fair.  After all, if I write a book, why should someone be able to go make a film out of it without licensing the right to do so (from me)? That being said, the concept of the right to derivative works seemingly neglects to account for the entire style that is Appropriation Art.  This style (or perhaps more accurately method considering it spans across several art forms and periods) is not expressly assessed in either American or Canadian Copyright legislation.

Judicial interpretation
Judges have a tendency to consider anything that makes use of previously existing art in any way a derivative work.  In Canada, constructing a building form a drawing can be considered copyright infringement.[ix]  Whether or not a human can perceive the use of the original in the new work is inconsequential.[x]  The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that translating the coding of computer software from one programming language to another constitutes a derivative work in the sense of the Copyright Act. This is also true in American jurisprudence[xi] It seems that judges are highly preoccupied with the author’s right without lending too much analysis of future implications the ruling may have on our cultural growth.  In the words of Professor David Vaver:

In deciding issues of Infringement, especially in an era of high experimentation with digital technology, courts must consider not only the parties’ immediate interest but also how any decision may affect future artistic behavior[xii]

Vaver is concerned with judges losing cite of Jefferson’s warning.  Copyright is an economic right to be sure.  However, to neglect the effects of a decision on future artistic creation is to ignore the very ethos that lies behind any intellectual property statute- The promotion of progress.

Though Canadian jurisprudence on Appropriation Art and derivative works is thin at best, American tribunals have had the opportunity to weigh in on the matter.  In Rogers v. Koons[xiii], the court rejected a famous artists fair use defense (based on parody) when he used a photo to create a sculpture.  The sculpture had nothing to do with the original photo itself.  There was nothing derivative in the work at all except for the use of the raw material.  The court rejected the parody defense for exactly that reason.   Had the sculpture been a critique or parody of the original photo (making it a derivative work) it would have been protected under the Fair Use doctrine.  However, because the artist transformed the old work into something new and creative that had absolutely no artistic connection to the old work, the artist was found liable for copyright infringement. A similar case was tried in 2008 in the Southern district of New York. 


[ii] See podcast on the Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince case here: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/suffolk-law/2011/03/patrick-cariou-v-richard-prince/ where professor Silbey mentions the origins of appropriation art.
[iii] Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in
The Writings of  Thomas Jefferson
, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1907), vol. XIII
[iv] Ibid.
[v] R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 §3
[vi] 17 USC §106
[vii] 17 USC §101
[viii] Prism Hospital Software Inc. v. Hospital Medical Records Institute (1994), 57 C.P.R. (3d) 129 at 278 (B.C.S.C.)
[ix] King Feature Syndicate Inc. v. O. & M. Kleeman Ltd., [1941] A.C 417 (H.L)
[x] Apple ComputersInc. V. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209
[xi] Phillips v. Kidsoft L.L.C, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1102 (D.C. Md. 1999)
[xii] VAVER D, Copyright Law, Irwin Law, 2000, p. 125
[xiii] 960 F.2d 301