Copyright Board Approves SOCAN Tariffs For Performance Of Musical Works Contained In Audiovisual And User-Generated Media Transmitted Over The Internet

The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) proposed two tariffs (Tariff 22.D.1 and 22.D.2) for the collection of royalties for musical works performed as part of audiovisual works transmitted over the internet. Several stakeholders including Facebook, Netflix and Bell objected and made submissions in opposition to the proposed Tariffs. On July 18, 2014, the Board rendered its Decision allowing the SOCAN Tariffs. 

Image by Renjith Krishnan

The royalty rates set in these Tariffs are based on an agreement reached during settlement negotiations between SOCAN and some of the original objectors. The Board addressed the setting of general tariffs based on agreements reached by copyright collectives and users in its decision in Re:Sound Tariff 5. That Tariff deals with the public performance of sound recordings. Before allowing an agreement to form the basis for a tariff, the Board said that it is “generally advisable” to consider: 

(a) The extent to which the parties to the agreements can represent the interests of all prospective users; and 

(b) Whether relevant comments or arguments made by former parties and non-parties have been addressed.

Since the Settlement Agreements here involved some of the biggest players, including Apple, Bell, Rogers and Cineplex, the Board found that the parties to the Agreement were sufficiently representative of the interests of other users. It also found that those objectors who were not party to the Agreement had ample opportunity to make their submissions. The Board also noted that the rates fixed in the Agreement were the fruit of extensive negotiations between skilled and savvy counsel.

Several grounds were raised by the objectors. Among them, Facebook and Netflix’s arguments bear some discussion. 

Facebook argued that it has a strict copyright enforcement policy and has implemented software to make sure that any protected uses of copyrighted works are prevented from being uploaded to its network. Facebook noted that any use of copyright protected works not caught by its software would qualify under the new UGC exception found at s.29.21 of the Copyright Act. 

Facebook also argued that an “audiovisual page impression” (defined in the Tariffs as “a page impression that allows a person to hear an audiovisual work”) should only give rise to a royalty when the work in question is actually viewed or heard. The wording of the Tariffs make it so that once a web page that contains the audiovisual work is loaded, a royalty is payable regardless of whether the work is ultimately accessed or not. 

The Board rejected the first argument out of hand. Whether Facebook’s activities would fall under the Tariffs is irrelevant. The Copyright Board sets tariffs of general application. If Facebook does not feel its activities fall under these Tariffs, it does not have to pay royalties until a court of competent jurisdiction says otherwise. To say that the Tariffs should not be allowed because it does not apply to Facebook is a non-sequitur.

The Board also rejected the argument on page impressions. It simply said that SOCAN’s proposed method of calculation was acceptable and consistent with other Tariff 22 classes. 

Netflix argued that its one-month free trials should not be captured by the Tariffs. It based this position on two arguments:

1) The free trial is fair dealing for the purpose of research along the lines of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN v. Bell (discussed here). In that case, the issue before the Court was whether the sampling of 30-90 second excerpts of musical works constituted fair dealing for the purpose of consumer research.

2) Paying SOCAN for free trials of the service would cause double compensation contrary to the principle of technological neutrality as set out by the Supreme Court in ESA v. SOCAN (discussed here).

On the fair dealing argument, the Board found the analogy between Netflix’s free trial period and the song previews in SOCAN v. Bell to be tenuous. There is a big difference between a low quality sample of a portion of a song and a high-quality, full version of a television show or movie. The Board also declined to look any further into fair dealing as no one (including Netflix) led sufficient evidence to make such a determination. 

The Board was equally unconvinced by Netflix’s technological neutrality argument. It reasoned that there is no technological alternative to Netflix’s free trial period that is or has been used in the offline world: “There is no alternative-technology equivalent to a Netflix free trial. Video stores never offered a free month’s membership with the right to rent as many videos as the customer wanted for no additional charge. Thus, there is no issue with technological neutrality.”

Thoughts

Overall the Board’s decision appears to be reasonable. Its rejection of Facebook’s argument regarding page impressions strikes me as a little dubious. Is there some technological reason why royalties should be calculated this way? Surely it would be more accurate to track the number of clicks received by the media player on the page than the raw number of times that the page is loaded. Some dynamic webpages have auto-refresh features that refresh parts of the page while leaving other parts untouched. This may skew results in favour of more compensation. Still, this outcome seems far from unreasonable. 

Netflix’s argument based on technological neutrality was puzzling. It asserted that allowing SOCAN to collect royalties for free trials would lead to “double dipping” (presumably because Netflix would have to pay a different royalty rate if the free user eventually subscribed). This seems a little simplistic. Surely Netflix is capable of –and certainly is- monitoring which free users eventually subscribe to its service. What is so difficult about subtracting the free trial royalty rate from the higher subscriber royalty rate and paying SOCAN that amount? 

To take a basic example, assume that the free trial royalty rate is $12/year (or $1 for a one-month free trial period) and that the regular royalty rate is 5% of the subscription fee which is $25/month. This would produce an annual royalty of $15 per subscriber.  For a subscriber who takes advantage of the free trial month and then signs up and pays the subscription fee for the rest of the year, all you have to do is subtract the free trial month amount ($1) from the annual royalty ($15) in order to assure that SOCAN is not paid twice for the same period of time (once at the free trial rate and once at the full rate).

While Netflix’s argument was ill-founded, I think the Board may have made a mistake in its reasons. Instead of rejecting Netflix’s argument for the reason set out above, the Board justified its decision by noting that in reality, video rental stores never offered free trials. It reasoned that given the lack of an analogue to Netflix’s free trials in the offline world, the latter’s argument based on the Supreme Court’s establishment of the principle of technological neutrality in ESA was moot. 

The principle of technological neutrality stands for the proposition that copyright protected works should be given the same treatment regardless of the technological medium by which they are conveyed. The Board uses the following example to illustrate: “…since only the reproduction right is triggered when a CD is sold in a store, only the reproduction right should be triggered when a digital album is sold online. The CD is an alternative technology to the digital download.”

The Board is essentially saying that technological neutrality only applies when there is an alternative technology that has been marketed to the public to compare the technology in question to. That need not necessarily be the case. There is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in ESA that limits the principle of technological neutrality to comparing extant (or previously extant) business models. This view cheapens the value of this interpretive principle. 

Take the facts from SOCAN v. Bell as an example. In that case, users could access previews of songs by clicking an icon on a service provider’s website. That decision has nothing to do with technological neutrality. However, for illustrative purposes, assume one of the parties wanted to make an argument for more or less compensation based on the principle of technological neutrality. They would have to come up with some analogous technology to the service provider’s website. One potential analogue to the website could be a business method by which music stores send individuals door to door with samples of music they have for sale. The sales representative would play the samples on CD’s or some other physical media; kind of like the Avon lady, but for music. 

To the best of my knowledge, this “Avon lady” sales model was never employed by record stores. This should not matter.  This method of distribution is conceivable and therefore ripe for comparison for copyright purposes. 

This hypothetical technological analogue theory has not been addressed in the case law. In ESA, the Court was comparing two modes of distribution (online digital delivery and shelf display in stores) that do in fact exist side by side. The Court in ESA did not expressly state whether the technological alternatives being compared must be ones that not only exist, but have been implemented in commerce. Given the Act’s statement of the s.3 right as the right to produce or reproduce a work “in any material form whatever”, the lack of limiting language in the Court’s decision should not rule out hypothetical technological alternatives concocted for the purpose of comparison. In that regard, the Board gave the principle of technological neutrality a more narrow interpretation than the one expressly prescribed by the Supreme Court. 

Finally, whether this decision is appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal is an interesting and open question. While it appears that the Board’s decision is reasonable, in light of the Majority of the Supreme Court’s ruling in ESA, the decision may be reviewed, at least in part, on a correctness standard.

USTR disapproves of ITC decision on Apple import ban

Bellow is an excerpt from an article I published on the Canadian Intellectual Property Blog (CIPB) regarding the USTR's overturning an ITC decision to prohibit Apple Inc. from importing its phones and tablets that infringe a Samsung Electronics Co. Patent.

On June 4^th, 2013, the International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a ruling prohibiting Apple Inc. (Apple) from importing its iPhone 3G, iPhone 3Gs, iPhone 4, iPad and iPad 2 because they infringe a patent owned by Samsung Electronics Co. (Samsung). On August 3^rd, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in a rare interventionist move, disapproved of the ITC’s ruling allowing Apple to continue its importation of the infringing products. 

Under § 1337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC may issue an exclusion order (injunctive type relief) against an entity that imports a patent infringing product. In deciding whether to grant the exclusion order, the ITC must consider the effects of the order on US trade and commerce. If the ITC believes that the public interest would not be best served by the issuance of the exclusion order, it has the discretion to refuse it. 

Samsung’s patent is what is known as a “standard-essential patent” (SEP). These patents cover inventions that must be incorporated into a given device if they are to meet some applicable technical standard. SEPs have the potential to give vertically integrated patent holders an advantage over their competitors whom, for all intents and purposes must license the technology from them. 

Please find the full article here

A look at the US Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft v. i4i

In 2009, a Canadian software development company out of Toronto named i4i Inc. won a $290 million law suit against Microsoft for wilfully infringing its patents.  The company developed a new form of document encoding known as XML (Extensible Markup Language). The versatility of the .xml extension lead to its integration into a number of software applications, including Microsoft Office. Microsoft, however, did not license the XML code.   

The Eastern District Court of Texas ruled in favor of i4i stating that a party accused of patent infringement, when asserting the invalidity of a patent, must convince the court of the invalidity by “clear and convincing evidence”.  This is a particularly high burden of proof and one not easily met.  

Photo by Darren Robertson

Microsoft fought the District Court’s interpretation in appeal but the outcome was the same.  Both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision and rejected Microsoft’s arguments demanding a lowering of the burden of proof and upheld the trial court’s ruling.

Justice Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous court (8-0 – Justice Thomas concurring. Chief Justice Roberts recused himself because he owns Microsoft stock) in saying that §282 of the American Patent Act of 1952 clearly states that a patent, once issued “shall be presumed valid”.  This places the burden of invalidating the patent on the other party. According to Sotomayor, it has long been settled law that the party alleging invalidity must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.  She cites a 1984 decision rendered by Judge Rich, one of the principal drafters of the 1952 Patent Act, supporting the clear and convincing standard.  In the 30 plus years since the aforementioned decision, the CAFC has never varied their opinion. 

Microsoft’s invalidity defense was twofold: First, they attempted to apply §102(b) of the Act that prohibits the issuing of patents when:

“the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States”

This provision, known as the “on-sale bar”, says that a patent that has been used or sold or has been disclosed in a publication more than one year before the patent is applied for is not patentable under the law. Microsoft claimed that the entirety of the XML patent was disclosed in a previously released i4i product called “S4”.  The Court, however, rejected this defence after hearing from two expert witnesses (the two principal inventors of the XML patent).

Microsoft’s second argument relied on the fact that when the XML patent was being examined, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) didn’t have the S4 patent to compare it to.   Relying on a recent decision, Microsoft asserted that when it is brought to light that the PTO didn’t have all relevant information during examination, the strength of their examination is greatly diminished.  Microsoft ultimately asserted that this lowered level of deference for the PTO should concordantly lower the standard of proof incumbent on a party alleging invalidity. 

Both of these arguments were utterly rejected by the Supreme Court who said that the “hybrid” burden of proof system Microsoft proposes has no precedent and no founding in law.  

Though the decision in this case turned primarily on statutory interpretation and the intention of Congress in enacting the law, Microsoft tried as hard as possible to make it seem that the issue at hand was the prior disclosure of the patent and the incomplete analysis of the PTO. 

Many IP professionals are skeptical of the value of this decision.  Surely had the ruling gone the other way, this case would be of paramount importance as it would be reversing a 35 year old interpretation that has thus far remained unchallenged.  Though some may question the importance of this decision outright, I am of the belief that the Supreme Court’s verdict affirms at least two points.

First, that the courts still show a high degree of deference towards the USPTO and therefore should continue to exercise judicial restraint in overturning its rulings.

Second, that smaller companies are capable of defeating behemoths like Microsoft when the law is in their favor.  Doubtless Microsoft fielded an expert team of attorneys who managed to conjure up and elucidate arguments that could have overturned a solid precedent.  Add to that the fact that a long list of tech giants such as Facebook, Google, Apple, Verizon etc. rallied behind Microsoft in support and you have a true David v. Goliath victory in favour of the Canadian i4i Inc. 

In my humble opinion, I think this case is most interesting for its rallying cry effect on smaller businesses than its actual implications on the legal framework of the US Patent system. As damaging as a $290 million verdict is, one would posit that if anyone could absorb such a loss it would be a company on the scale and magnitude of Microsoft. Though this decision surely is a blow to the tech giant, I don’t think too many people are (or should be) balling their eyes out for them right now...except Chief Justice Roberts that is...

Copyright in the Cloud

“The Cloud”.  For those who keep up with tech this term is nothing new.  For those who do not, “The Cloud” or “Cloud Computing” refers to web based software and online data storage.  The growing trend in computing today seems to denote a shift away from hard disk storage and software to this new online framework.  

Three of the major players- among others- in the tech space are harnessing the power of the cloud to offer web based music player and storage services.  On May 10^th, Google unveiled its new online music storage service at the Google I/O conference.   Amazon has already released their “Cloud Player” and Apple is reportedly in the process of coming out with their cloud based music offering.

Though these services are not and likely will not make it to Canada in the short term, the question beckons as to whether or not they would present copyright issues here.  Leaving out the obvious distribution licensing issues, the current Canadian Copyright Act does not allow for format shifting (the transferring of a media from one format to another). 

The format most widely used to encode digital music is without a doubt the MP3.  So if the music is uploaded in MP3 format there is no issue.  However, not all music files are MP3’s.  WMA, AIFF and FLAC are just some of the other file formats in which people’s music are often encoded.  In this event, the service provider- in this case Google Amazon or Apple- would be forced to convert the file type into MP3 format to render it compatible with the player. 

This would ultimately mean that the service providers must acquire a publishing license to properly operate the service.  Such a consideration might appear to be minor; but in reality it may prove to be a larger barrier to entry than one would think.  Needless to say a publishing license would be more costly.  Also, the music purchased from the provider would always be in MP3 form meaning that any format shifting that need occur would only concern music files the person uploaded from their existing library.  Therefore, the additional cost of licensing would be a bullet the service providers would have to take without seeing a profit directly related to it.  These providers will likely swallow this cost as a necessary evil.  After all, web based music services become much less attractive if the consumer cannot upload the music they have previously acquired.

The now defunct Bill C-32, Canada`s most recent attempt at modernizing our contextually archaic copyright law, provided for a “consumer exception” that would allow format shifting for private use.   It is unclear however if that would include this type of activity.  The provision was originally conceived to allow consumers to transfer their media from one platform to another (i.e. from a CD to an IPod).  In this case, it would be Google or Amazon executing the format shift.  Furthermore, one of the requirements in the Bill is that the original copy not be infringing.  Therefore, if the service provider is caught format shifting their client’s illegally downloaded music, the provision would not apply and they could feasibly be held liable for secondary infringement. 

It is clear that tech is going the way of the cloud.  It will become increasingly difficult for Canadian policy to ignore that fact.  It is somewhat embarrassing that Canadian copyright law has not been modified since 1997.  That’s two years prior to the birth of Napster!  One thing is certain. Further neglect to the modernization of copyright in Canada will have the undesired effect of leaving us in the dust of technological progress; an outcome most Canadians are probably unwilling to accept.